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Abstract 
Existing accounts of the origin of human 
communication assume a pre-existing behavioral 
system shared among members of a social group. This 
paper is concerned with the origin of that system; 
specifically, it explores its characteristics and 
functionality as well as the circumstances under which 
it could have appeared. A number of agent-based 
computer simulations test whether the capacities for 
arbitrary imitation and pattern completion can lead to a 
behavioral system that could be co-opted for 
communication. The results show that arbitrary 
imitation and pattern completion may indeed generate a 
population-wide shared behavioral system whose 
structure reflects the structure of the environment, and 
therefore could easily have been co-opted for 
communication. This system may have paved the way 
for other biological capacities widely believed to be 
necessary for communication, such as shared 
intentionality and symbolicity, to co-evolve. 
Introduction 
Much human socially transmitted culture arguably 
depends on arbitrarily copying learnt patterns whose 
function or origin is often unknown to the learner. This 
is illustrated by Gergely and Csibra’s (2006) Sylvia’s 
ham recipe story: Sylvia always cut the end of the ham 
when she cooked it because that is the way her mother 
did it; when the mother saw her do that, and asked why, 
Sylvia told her: “Because that is the way you always 
did it”. The mother explained that her pan was too small 
to hold a whole ham, and that was why she had to cut 
off the end. Children engage in mindless imitation of 
elaborate actions even when these are irrelevant for the 
desired goal (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons, Young & 
Keil, 2007; Whiten et al., 1996), or even for no 
apparent goal, as illustrated by the personal observation 
(which partly inspired this research) of a 24-month-old 
who, after seeing his mother clap her hands to try and 
catch moths on multiple occasions, interrupted his 
playing to clap when he saw a moth in the room, even if 
the moth was so far he could not possibly catch it – and 
he did not even attempt to. Mindlessly imitated 
behavior, especially if it is not costly, may entrench the 
use of non-functional patterns in a community; this 
increases the degree of structure (reduces randomness) 
in the cultural environment, which therefore becomes 
easier to process and learn. This paper explores the role 
of arbitrary imitation in the origin of communication in 
our species.  
Recent approaches to the evolution of human 
communication propose that humans evolved a unique 
biological adaptation, the socio-cognitive capacity for 
theory of mind (Tomasello, 1999) or symbolic 
reference (Deacon, 1997). This adaptation presupposes 
and relies on non-communicative behavior being 
already in place (Tomasello et al. 1997), for instance 
the behavior sequences observed in chimpanzees 
resulting from ontogenetic ritualisation (Tomasello & 
Call, 1997). During the transition to communication, 
non-communicative behavior would come to be 
understood as a reflection of others’ meanings or 
intentions. In this study I explore an alternative kind of 
pre-communication behavior system caused by the 
evolution of the general cognitive capacity to decouple 
means from ends, instantiated as the abstraction of form 
from function and the abstraction of behavior from the 
producer of behavior. 
Arbitrary imitation for pattern completion 
Imitation has been proposed as one capacity that 
preceded and may have afforded the evolution of 
communicative behavior (Donald, 1991; Zlatev, 2007). 
Tomasello (1999) claimed that only human cultural 
behavior involves true imitation, or replication of the 
means that another individual employed to obtain an 
end or function, as opposed to emulation, or achieving 
the same function as the other individual, regardless of 
the means employed. I focus on arbitrary imitation, or 
replication of behavior irrespective of whether it can be 
identifiable as a means to an end or not. 
Possible motivations for arbitrary imitation include a 
conformity bias (Asch 1955) and a pattern completion 
(hereafter, PC) bias. I focus on the latter. PC is the 
activation of a complete representation upon exposure 
to a partial representation and is invoked as the 
fundamental cognitive mechanism in approaches to 
learning and cognition such as Sign Gestalt Expectancy 
(Tolman, 1932) and connectionism (Bishop, 1995; 
Ripley, 1996).  
Consider the following pattern as experienced by one 
individual: the recurrent correlation of a number of 
stimuli, including objects and individuals in the 
environment and behavior produced by oneself or by 
others. If the behavior component is missing from an 
(incomplete) instance of this pattern, the individual may 
satisfy the PC bias by producing the missing behavior, 
and thus complete the pattern. If the behavior produced 
is a copy of a behavior observed in another individual, 
and if the behavior itself has no other function than to 
complete a current pattern, we have an instance of 
arbitrary imitation for PC. 
Arbitrary imitation for PC requires the two 
abstractions mentioned above: first, it requires 
decoupling behavior from its iconic or primary utility 
function. Here, behavior’s functionality resides in being 
the missing bit that completes the current context 
pattern. Second, individuals must assume that behavior 
produced by oneself is equivalent to behavior produced 
by another individual, and that both are equally good 
completions of a pattern.  
Hypothesis 
This paper is concerned with the idea that arbitrary 
imitation for PC evolved in hominins prior to the 
appearance of communication. Specifically, I test the 
hypothesis that arbitrary imitation for PC in a 
population can result in a behavioral system that both 
(a) reflects the structure of the population’s 
environment, and (b) is shared by all members of the 
population, in the absence of any intention or 
expectation of communication.  
Behaviors are cumulatively perceived and processed 
by individuals in the community. We assume that 
individuals in a social group are exposed to similar 
patterns; therefore imitation for PC should increase the 
level of structure in the environment by increasing the 
frequency of the imitated behaviors (through individual 
behavior “downloading” information onto the common 
environment, as in Clark, 1997). This more structured 
environment can then be more easily exploited by other 
individuals’ arbitrary imitation for further PC activity. 
Moreover, this should result in an emergent social 
coordination of the associations or mappings between 
behaviors and other aspects of the environment among 
the individuals in the population. The only missing 
requirement for communication involves a dyadic 
social dimension, most likely related to theory of mind, 
that is absent from, but that could have evolved on top 
of, arbitrary imitation.  
If arbitrary imitation for pattern completion had a 
foundational role in communication, and it is 
anecdotically observed today in examples such as 
Sylvia’s story, it would suggest there is scope to further 
test the present-day role of this cognitive bias in the 
maintenance and shaping of communication systems 
such as language.  
Methods 
The hypothesis explained above is tested with a 
computer simulation experiment where agents learn 
about their environment and produce behavior. Unlike 
other models of language evolution (e.g. Kirby, 2002; 
Steels, 2002), the present simulations do not include 
communicative function or intention. Arbitrary 
imitation is implemented by letting the agents have 
access to (“be able to observe”) the behavior 
productions of others. Behavior production is either 
guided by a heuristic that maximizes the systematicity 
of the agents’ internal representation of the world 
(which optimizes the possibility of correct PC), or is 
produced randomly. Finally, the environment structure 
is also manipulated. 
Figure 1. An agent’s memory or cooccurrence matrix. 
In the simulation run that generated this matrix there 
were 3 objects and 3 behaviors; the complete matrix 
and the object and behavior matrix subsets are 
symmetrical; the two mapping matrix subset are not 
(they are mirror images of each other). 
  
Agents do associative learning based on co-
occurrence: the level of association between two items 
for an individual is proportional to the frequency with 
which they have co-occurred in the same context in the 
individual’s experience. Their memory is a symmetric 
square matrix storing the cooccurrence counts between 
every pair of stimuli (see Fig. 1). 
Each simulation consists of a number of interactions 
where the agents observe and interact with the 
environment thus:  
1. A proportion of the agents in the population are 
randomly selected as participants (observers) in the 
current context; a proportion of the observers are 
randomly selected to be also producers of behavior.  
2. A current environment is constructed by randomly 
selecting objects (which may be repeated) from the 
object set.  
3. Each producer in turn observes the current 
environment and selects a behavior from its 
behavior repertoire applying either a PC heuristic or 
randomly (see below). After all producers have 
made their selections, the behaviors are added to the 
current context.   
4. Each observer agent increases the cooccurrence 
frequency count between each and every other 
elements in the current context it has access to in its 
memory matrix.  
Independent variables 
As already mentioned, three independent variables are 
manipulated in the simulations: (1) whether there is 
imitation or not (2) whether behavior selection is 
guided by PC or is random and (3) the environment 
structure. 
1. In the imitation conditions, agents can observe 
other agents’ behaviors, and consider those behaviors as 
part of the current context. They therefore register the 
cooccurrence between their own and others’ behaviors 
and the objects in the environment, as well as 
cooccurrences among objects. In the control (no 
imitation) condition, agents only register cooccurrence 
among objects and between their own behavioral 
productions and the objects.  
2. In the PC conditions, producers select the behavior 
that is most likely to be activated in their memory 
matrix given the objects in the current context and 
given an expectation of regularity (expect the same 
object-object and object-behavior combinations to 
occur again and again). This is implemented by agents 
selecting the behavior that maximizes the systematicity 
of the memory matrix resulting from their own 
individual experience over successive contexts. The 
measure of systematicity (Syst) is based on RegMap 
(Tamariz & Smith, 2008), a formalization of Hebbian 
learning that quantifies the regularity of the mappings 
between two domains (e.g. between signals and 
meanings in a language). RegMap uses information 
theory’s redundancy (Eqn. 1) and frequency.  
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Redundancy is 1 minus the entropy (H), and 
measures the structure of a system, its departure from 
randomness or its predictability. Syst is measured as 
follows: For an object-behavior (O, B) pair, first a 
matrix is created by computing the cooccurrence 
frequencies xij between each object i and each behavior 
j. Syst is then calculated for B given O (Eqn. 2) and for 
O given B (Eqn. 3), which are finally combined to 
obtain Syst(O, B) (the measure that is maximized in the 
PC heuristic) using Eqn. 4. 
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In the control (no PC) heuristic condition, speakers 
select a behavior at random from the behavior 
repertory.  
3. Three conditions of environment structure are 
tested: In the random environment, the probability of an 
object appearing in the current context of an interaction 
is equal to that of, and independent of the appearance 
of, other objects. In the frequency-based environment 
condition, the object set has an exponential frequency 
distribution: . In the dependency 
environment condition, the presence of an object in the 
context is determined by the presence of another object. 
Context construction in the simulations below (context 
size = 8; four object types O = {1,2,3,4}) consists of 
random selection of one object oi, and inclusion in the 
context of four tokens of oi and four of oi+1. In this way, 
each object oi only ever co-occurs with object oi+1. 
Dependent variables 
Two variables are measured at the end of each run of 
the simulation, based on the agent’s memory matrices.  
1. The first one is the level of coordination of the 
mappings, measuring the degree to which individuals 
in the population have reached similar mapping matrix 
subset states. This is quantified as the average of the 
coordination of the mapping matrix subset for each pair 
of agents in the population. For a pair of agents (A, B), 
the coordination of their mapping matrices is given in 
Eqn. 5. It equals the square root of the correlation 
(Pearson’s r) between their mapping matrices 
multiplied by the average variance of the same mapping 
matrices.  
 (5) 
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 2. The second dependent variable is related to the 
potential of a behavioral system in the population to be 
co-opted for communication. Mappings that could be 
co-opted for communication need to be potentially apt 
for one-to-one mappings for both production and 
comprehension, therefore the systematicity for 
production and comprehension values are measured 
using Eqns. 2 and 3 applied to the mapping subset of 
each agent’s memory matrix. Syst(B|O) relates to 
production and measures how confident a speaker can 
be, given its mapping matrix subset (its knowledge 
about object-signal mappings), about which behavior to 
select to express an object. Syst(O|B) relates to 
comprehension and measures how confident an 
observer can be of which object a behavior refers to. 
Results 
The simulations are run with 10 agents. At each 
interaction, 6 observer agents are present, of which 3 
are also producers; the context includes 8 object tokens 
selected from a repertory of 4 object types. The agents 
have a repertory of 4 behaviors to select from. Each 
simulation is run for 600 interactions (when the systems 
have reached stable values of the dependent variables), 
at the end of which the average coordination and 
systematicity of the agents’ mapping subset of their 
memory matrices are recorded. 
The experiment design exhaustively combines two 
imitation conditions (imitation and no imitation), two 
behavior selecting heuristics (PC and random) and three 
environment structures (random, frequency-structured 
and dependency-structured). 130 simulations were run 
with each factor combination of the 2 x 2 x 3 design.  
Coordination of the mappings in the population 
The level of coordination of the mappings among the 
agents in the population at the end of the simulation 
runs was measured in all possible condition 
combinations (Fig. 2). Coordination is significantly 
positively affected both by imitation and PC, and there 
is a strong interaction between the two: two-factor 
ANOVA tests in every world structure returned 
p<0.001 for each factors and for their interaction in all 
three environment structure conditions. Mapping 
coordination is also significantly affected by the 
environment structure, with one-way ANOVA tests run 
in all four imitation x pattern-completion combination 
conditions also returning p<0.001.  
No PC, i.e. random selection of behavior (top and 
bottom left plots), generates random mappings, which, 
naturally, tend to be different for each agent (low 
coordination). In the dependency and, especially, the 
frequency-structured environments, however, agents are 
more likely to converge on similar mappings. When a 
PC heuristic is in place alone (top right plot) 
coordination is increased: a non-random heuristic 
generates more non-random mapping matrices; because 
of this, the Pearson’s r component of the coordination 
measure becomes less obscured by the variance factor 
(Eqn. 5). Additionally, when agents interact with a 
structured environment, mappings are better 
coordinated.  
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Figure 2. The degree of mapping coordination in the 
agent population in the 12 combinations of imitation x 
PC levels x environment structure. Each box-plot shows 
sample minimum, lower quartile, median, upper 
quartile and sample maximum. 
 
When PC is combined with imitation (bottom right 
plot) coordination is much higher in the three 
environments. This is driven not only by heuristic and 
the initial environment structure, but also by the fact 
that the behavior that each agent produces (in a non-
random way, following a PC heuristic) becomes part of 
the environment that is observed and learned by the 
population, thus increasing the level of structure in the 
environment.  
The effect of environment structure is apparent in all 
four plots, with frequency structure returning the 
highest coordination values, followed by dependency 
structure and finally by random structure. In the 
frequency-structured environment, the proportions of 
objects in the interactions will be skewed, importantly, 
in the same direction for all agents. Dependency 
structure results in contexts that are more similar 
between agents than random structure, but because the 
dependencies are between the objects, each agent will 
experience a more unique frequency distribution of 
objects in the contexts it is exposed to than in the 
frequency-structured environment condition.  
Systematicity of the mappings 
If the mappings are to be co-optable for 
communication, they must be systematic both for 
production and for comprehension.  
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Figure 3. Systematicity of the mappings for the 
purposes of production in all condition combinations. 
 
Fig. 3 shows that the PC heuristic strongly increases 
the systematicity of the agents’ mappings for 
production: it all but eliminates the uncertainty for 
behavior selection for production. When arbitrary 
imitation is also present, mappings are even more 
highly systematic in all environments. In the random 
environment, production is always very unambiguous 
(each agent produces always the same unique 
behavior); in the frequency-structured environment, 
systematicity is more variable, but with high values; in 
the dependency-structured environment there is more 
ambiguity, and also a wider range of possible 
systematicity outcomes, with a clear bimodal 
distribution (not apparent in the figure): in half of the 
cases, a single behavior is produced every time, as in 
the random environment, but in the other half, distinct 
behaviors are produced for distinct objects. This 
indicates that PC strongly contributes to mapping 
systematicity for production in all environment 
structures.  
The pattern is very different for systematicity in 
comprehension (Fig. 4). Most obviously, even the 
highest values (in the conditions including PC) are 
clearly lower than those for systematicity for 
production. This is due to the fact that agents in the PC 
conditions are maximizing the systematicity of their 
memory matrices by producing behavior; their 
productions accrue to the environment, which becomes 
cumulatively more systematic for production. 
Unambiguous comprehension, on the other hand, is 
only possible if the environment is structured, and the 
agents cannot alter this in the present simulations. The 
results for systematicity for comprehension in the 
structured environments are nevertheless highly 
significantly different from those in the baseline 
random environment in all cases. 
It is evident in Fig. 4 that the structure of the 
environment alone (even in the absence of imitation 
PC) confers a degree of unambiguous comprehension. 
PC only affects systematicity for comprehension in the 
dependency environment. In this environment, 
comprehension systematicity is consistently higher than 
for any other environment in the absence of imitation. 
When imitation is present, however, comprehension 
systematicity also has a bimodal distribution (not 
apparent in the figure): in about half of the runs, the 
heuristic makes no difference; in the other half, 
systematicity is much higher than without imitation, 
overlapping with that in the no imitation condition (top 
right), if statistically different from it: 2-tailed t-test, t27 
= 6.36; P<0.001. 
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Figure 4. Systematicity of the mappings for the 
purposes of comprehension in all condition 
combinations. 
Potential suitability for communication 
The ideal behavioral system to be potentially co-optable 
for communication should have all of (1) high 
coordination, (2) high systematicity for production and 
(3) high systematicity for comprehension. These three 
requirements are only met in 50% of the runs in the 
+imitation, +PC, dependency-structured environment 
condition.  
Discussion 
Imitation and PC together enhance the coordination of 
the mappings between objects and behaviors in the 
population to a much higher degree than either 
separately. PC enhances systematicity for production 
because the agents simply seek to have a memory 
matrix that allows unambiguous selection of behavior 
for production, and are under no pressure to produce 
behaviors that will be understood by others.  
The frequency-structured environment enhances 
systematicity for comprehension. Here, some objects 
are so frequent that the mapping matrix ends up 
reflecting the object frequency and a strategy of 
interpreting a behavior as referring to the most frequent 
object is better than chance. The dependency-structured 
environment also has an impact, in the cases where 
agents converge on the same systems (high 
coordination) and the association between each object 
and a unique signal is further enhanced over time by the 
agents’ coordinated productions.  
Arbitrary imitation improves systematicity for 
production, but seems to have negative effects for 
systematicity for comprehension in the dependency 
environment. However, in this condition we have, 
again, a bimodal distribution, including very low 
comprehension systematicity values, but also some very 
high ones, when two or three behaviors are produced, 
which can be unambiguously associated to specific 
objects, a crucial advantage if communication is to co-
opt the system. These results indicates that the structure 
of the environment, especially if it includes 
dependencies between objects, can result, in half of the 
cases, in significantly-higher-than-chance systematicity 
of the mappings both for production and 
comprehension.  
Therefore, this study suggests that the most 
propitious conditions for the emergence of a behavioral 
system that could be co-opted for communication 
include arbitrary imitation for PC and a dependency-
structured environment. Moreover, this result supports 
the idea that a cognitive bias for imitation may have 
been instrumental for the origin of communication 
(Donald, 1971; Zlatev, 2007). Additionally, it proposes 
a mechanism whereby arbitrary or blind imitation 
(Gergely & Csibra, 2006) for pattern completion results 
in the coordination of cultural conventions in a 
population and thus can play a role not only in the 
origin but also in the ongoing spread and maintenance 
of symbolic cultural conventional systems including 
language. 
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